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ABSTRACT: This paper introduces the papers in this special issue and uses them as evidence through which to 
examine four questions. First: are we witnessing a widespread (re)turn to big infrastructure projects for water 
management? The evidence suggests that large-scale infrastructure development has remained largely unswayed 
by the 'ecological turn', or the promotion of demand management or 'soft path' thinking, despite a drop in 
investments observed at the turn of the 20th century. Second: do these new projects have different justifications 
from those of the past? The papers in this issue provide evidence that the need to justify capital-intensive 
infrastructure in the face of commitments to sustainability, while borrowing from the conventional grammar of 
project justifications, has generated a few innovative tropes and rhetorical devices. Third: what does a (re)turn (or 
enduring commitment) to big infrastructure tells us about the governance and wider politics of large-scale 
infrastructure problems? Some of the traditional interest groups are well represented in the stories told here – 
the corporations that demand water or compete to build pipes and dams; the large-scale irrigators that rely on 
water to expand their production; the engineers and consultants who seek money, prestige, career advancement 
or even satisfaction from 'controlling' nature; the politicians who can extract 'rents' from all this activity. Even so, 
the history of each particular project involves many contingencies – of the society’s history, of previous rounds of 
infrastructure and of capital availability. Fourth: have there been changes in the scale at which water is managed 
within countries? In general, it seems there has been an increase in the scale of projects, generally involving a 
shift in power away from regional and up to multi-regional agencies of governance, such as the central state. 
Sometimes these shifts in scale and power have no effect on the salience of local voices – because in the past they 
were never heard or generally suppressed anyway. Sometimes the shifts in power and scale have been 
accompanied by increasing suppression of local voices of opposition. In one case – South Africa – the change in 
scale has seen a stand-off between representatives of new voices and the infrastructure-focussed engineering 
elite. 
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Infrastructures are networks that enable the flow of goods, people or ideas and allow their exchange 
over space (Larkin, 2013). Their topology and physical form influence the speed and direction of 
movement. Infrastructures, in this sense, are technological objects. Water distribution systems are thus 
networks that link water in rivers, lakes and storage sites to plumbing in people’s homes, to irrigation 
pipes in farmers’ fields, or to outlets in factories, enabling that water to perform economic but also 
social functions. Infrastructures mediate between societies and their environments. In the most general 
sense, water infrastructure consists of dams, levees, canals, pipes, pumps and water treatment plants 
(machines). Such infrastructures also include the links between those machines that allow them to 
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function as a system, as well as techniques of organisation – corporations, accounting, bureaucracies 
and the like (Molle et al., 2009b). These infrastructures, of course, exist in society, and often embody, 
reflect, and, in turn, shape their political, economic, and social surroundings. 
 Humans have relied on water management infrastructures since the dawns of civilisations. Dams, 
river control constructions and water delivery canals were important objects of state activity in ancient 
Egypt as in China, in Mesopotamia and, more recently, in the southwestern United States. Such objects 
tend to be rooted in supply-side management principles: provide more water to meet demand or 
anticipated growth in demand. Yet, alongside the attempts to deliver more water has co-existed an 
understanding that rising demand for water must ultimately be constrained. Even in ancient Rome, 
more than adequately supplied with water and believing that flowing water was a sign of a high 
standard of living, water-saving devices (such as taps and storage cisterns) were widely deployed 
(Bruun, 1991: 103). 
With increasing human population – in both numbers and concentrations – has come the 
proliferation of arguments for both enlarging water supplies and for the development of new demand 
management strategies. The apparent acceptance of each argument has fluctuated over time and 
across space. Recently, in the 1990s and 2000s we saw a turn toward 'softer' approaches to water 
management. For example, the World Bank, historically a major funder of large water infrastructure 
projects, shifted away from funding large dams in the mid-1990s. This trend spread, particularly 
following the publication of the now-well known World Commission on Dams report, 'Dams and 
Development', which condemned the social and ecological consequences of large dams (WCD, 2000). 
While the publication of this report points to a shift away from supply-side approaches that was already 
being promoted under different guises (see Postel and Richter, 2003; Brooks et al., 2009; Gleick, 2002), 
it also catalyzed further change along those lines. Across much of the world (with some important 
exceptions), in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction and the service industries, and from 
the world’s largest development institutions to the smallest non-government organisations, the 
emphasis came to be largely on increasing the efficiency with which water was used. The underlying 
goal of this approach was to restrain consumption with the hope – for some – of reserving more water 
for environmental purposes. With a dramatic drop in the construction of new dams (particularly large 
dams) and other large projects, the turn of the century seemed to give way to 'softer' approaches and 
demand management, with a focus on pricing, water markets, user participation, awareness raising, 
precise scheduling, retrofitted appliances, and the like. 
More recently, however, we have begun to see a resurgence of large-scale water infrastructure 
projects, from inter-basin water transfers and massive dams, to desalination plants, sea walls, and tidal 
barriers under development in Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America. Many such projects are 
documented in the papers of this special issue. While we note that some of these projects (China’s 
Three Gorges Dam, for example) were underway even as softer approaches came to dominate in many 
parts of the world, taken together, the resurgence of these types of concrete-heavy forms of water 
management suggests a turn back to the high-modernist (and earlier) reliance on big infrastructure as a 
strategy for addressing a range of water-related issues, including regional scarcity, sea-level rise, and 
flooding. 
The World Bank, once a global leader on, and good barometer for, the engagement of multilateral 
lending institutions in big infrastructure construction, has quietly returned to financing large dams since 
the mid-2000s, including Bujagali in Uganda and Nam Theun 2 in Lao PDR. It has developed new 
language ('high-risk high-reward projects', 'sustainable hydropower', 'triple bottom-line', etc), "[r]e-
engag[ed] with agricultural water management" (World Bank, 2006) and has recently put dams centre 
stage again as necessary tools for climate-proofing (World Bank, 2016). As Peter Bosshard, former 
Executive Director of International Rivers noted in 2013, "The World Bank (…) still finds it easier to 
spend billions of dollars on mega-projects than to support the small, decentralised projects that are 
most effective at expanding energy access in rural areas. It appears to be caught in the development 
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model of past decades" (Bosshard, 2013). The pendulum, it seems, has begun to swing back in the other 
direction, especially as newer global financing organisations like the Asian Development Bank and the 
Export-Import Bank of China begin to gain in influence. 
Using examples of these types of projects, the papers in this special issue explore the questions of 
whether and, if so, why, we are seeing a return to a 20th century water management paradigm centred 
on big infrastructure and, often, supply-side management principles, and what this (re)turn to big 
infrastructure tells us about the political-economic forces driving water management today. The issue 
features twelve articles, spanning every inhabited continent except Australia, ten countries, and a range 
of theoretical frameworks and disciplinary traditions. 
Beginning in Asia, where several countries struggle with severe water stress, growing urban 
populations, and the environmental externalities of rapid economic growth, we have three papers. 
First, Luxion analyses the politics of the Narmada Drinking Water Pipeline in Gujarat, India and the 
various political roles of this megaproject. Crow-Miller, Webber and Rogers address the techno-politics 
of big infrastructure in China and the nature and functioning of what they term the 'Chinese Water 
Machine'. Colven demonstrates how a geographically and historically contingent techno-political 
network has driven the construction of Jakarta’s Great Garuda Sea Wall (GGSW) Project as a solution to 
urban flooding, even as it fails to address the root cause of the city’s flood challenges. She uses the case 
of the GGSW, a project with strong post-colonial ties to the Netherlands, to point to "a need to 
provinicialise emergent narratives charting the apparent, rise, fall and return to big infrastructure" 
(Colven). 
Next, in the only paper about Europe, Osti examines anti-flood detention basin projects in Northern 
Italy, and reflects on whether they depart from the conventional infrastructural projects of the past. To 
the south in Africa, two articles provide historical accounts of the legacy of colonial structures and 
attitudes on current water management practices. Blomkvist and Nilsson recount the history of water 
supply to Nairobi, Kenya, examining in particular the past and current policy choices that have 
underpinned the construction of the Northern Collector Tunnel project. In the context of post-
apartheid South Africa, Bourblanc examines the decisions about the second phase of the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project to illuminate the difficulties of managing water demand in the context of the 
struggles between a black water bureaucracy and a white water engineering fraternity. 
Four articles focus on Latin America. Warner, Hoogesteger, and Hidalgo examine the recent wave of 
hydropower, flood control and irrigation projects in Ecuador and how they coexist with the promoted 
'soft' ideology of 'buen vivir'. In Mexico, McCulligh and Tetreault explore water management and 
infrastructure issues, arguing that a 'concrete-heavy' focus on water projects has persisted through the 
late 20th and into the 21st century, despite national turns in both policy and discourse toward 
sustainability-oriented water management strategies. What has changed in recent decades, they claim, 
is the level of private-sector participation in the space of water infrastructure, as well as the level of 
resistance to such projects by local communities. Mills-Novoa and Hermoza analyse the advent of a 
trans-Andean tunnel in Piura, northern Peru, where water from the Andean slope of the Andes is to be 
transferred to develop irrigation on the Pacific slope. They show how the decision-making process of 
megaprojects remains centralised and unaffected by demand-management rhetoric. Much of the same 
is reported from Brazil by Roman, who recounts the tribulations of the São Francisco inter-basin water 
transfer project ('transposição'). 
Finally, two papers examine projects in the United States. Welsh and Endter-Wada look at how the 
Southern Nevada Water Authority is trying to build a pipeline to appropriate groundwater from rural 
basins to serve the Las Vegas metropolitan area and mitigate risks or relying on the Colorado River for 
water. They point to a history in the American West of government subsidies for water infrastructure to 
promote economic development in arid regions, which have created a growing, region-wide 
dependency on increasingly uncertain water supplies. Lastly, Perry and Praskievicz address the 
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emerging need for additional water storage in the U.S. West as climate change brings increased 
uncertainty to regional water supplies. Drawing on cases in California and Oregon, they illustrate the 
rise of auxiliary infrastructure, including the augmentation of existing dams, but suggest that demand-
side strategies must also be expanded. 
Collectively these articles attempt to shed light on a number of important questions. Foremost, we 
ask the question of whether or not we are currently witnessing a widespread (re)turn to big 
infrastructure projects for water management. The promotion of demand-management is often seen as 
a reaction to the shortcomings, third-party impacts, or failures of conventional engineered responses to 
water scarcity, and therefore as a 'counter-policy'. Does this mean that supply augmentation options 
and infrastructure projects have been put on the back burner? It is apparent that both supply- and 
demand-side policies and their associated discourses often coexist. While the justification generally 
given is that the water situation in a given place is so serious as to necessitate the pursuit of all types of 
'solutions' in conjunction, it is interesting to examine how hard and soft policies coexist, discursively 
and practically, in national policies and political discourses. 
In countries such as Kenya (Blomkvist and Nilsson)1, there never was a turn away from big 
infrastructure, merely a period of stasis in the building programme. Likewise in Indonesia (Colven), the 
soft approach never came to dominate in the first place and (big) infrastructure has never been phased 
out, with the US$40 billion Garuda Great Sea Wall megaproject as an extreme illustration of the 
persistence of this approach. In Gujarat, India (Luxion), limited energy has been spent on advancing 
demand management strategies and the Gujarat Water Regulatory Authority, formed in 2012 in 
anticipation of the state water policy, was defunct within a year. The prevailing discourse has centred 
on a supply-side approach hinging on the Sardar Sarovar Project as well as the battles for appropriating 
Narmada’s waters at the federal level and increasing the height of Sardar Sarovar Dam. 
In the western U.S., changes in climate and growing urban water demand have prompted a return to 
the supply-side water management approaches that dominated for much of the 20th century, but were 
supplanted by conservation policies by the 1980s. Perry and Praskievicz argue that the return to big 
infrastructure is not limited to developing countries and that it is not always about constructing new 
infrastructure, but also about leveraging existing infrastructure to increase water-storage capacity. 
"Auxiliary infrastructure projects are attractive to water managers because they purportedly work 
within the modern framework of environmental regulation that often precludes the development of 
new large dams in developed countries" (Perry and Praskievicz). However, these approaches are not 
sufficient for coping with emerging challenges and must be pursued in tandem with demand-side 
strategies. 
But the opposite argument is often made, even within regions. In Las Vegas, the Southern Nevada 
Water Authority (SNWA) has worked hard to conserve water and reduce the city’s extravagant per 
capita water use from 1314 litre/capita/day (l/c/d) in 1990 to 488 l/c/d. This has been possible through 
indoor and outdoor water conservation strategies, wastewater reuse, education campaigns, water use 
restriction programmes, and various incentives, such as those that encourage the replacement of 
traditional lawns with more water-efficient landscaping. Welsh and Endter-Wada explain that these 
efforts in water demand management have helped the SNWA justify additional water supply and 
infrastructure projects, arguing that demand management is not enough when the Colorado River is in 
continual shortage and climate change brings additional uncertainty about both short- and long-term 
water supply. 
In South Africa (Bourblanc), demand management is rhetorically salient in strategic policy 
documents, but its implementation has proved to be very challenging, as illustrated, for example, by 
the problematic establishment of decentralised basin-level management agencies. The Water Use 
                                                          
1
 In the remainder of this article, authors cited without reference year are contributors to this special issue. 
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Efficiency Directorate is mostly confined to education and awareness campaigns, or documenting use 
efficiency in various sectors. Recently, the government has reiterated its faith in big infrastructural 
solutions with the announcement of plans for the construction of new dams, including the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project. 
McCulligh and Tetrault show that while dam-building in Mexico has been on the decline since 
roughly 1980, there has been increased spending on water supply and sanitation over the last decade 
and a half. They argue that under an institutional arrangement that encourages private-sector 
investment in physical infrastructure, concrete-heavy projects continue to dominate management 
approaches for urban water supply despite increasing government rhetoric around environmental 
sustainability and demand management. They highlight "the increasing dissonance between official 
state discourse, with its stress on ecological sustainability and political participation, and the actual 
orientation of water policies and projects". The case of Mexico demonstrates a formal engagement 
with globally circulating discourses around sustainability and Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) that has little substance in actual practice. 
A similar situation is found in Peru by Mills-Novoa and Hermoza, where the promotion of 
agribusiness and private investments justifies several megaprojects, including trans-Andean tunnels 
that transfer water from the Amazonian slope of the Andes to develop irrigation on the Pacific slope 
and the coast. In this case, the soft/participatory turn has been useful to attract money from the Inter-
American Development Bank and other donors in support of the establishment and the capacity-
building of river basin councils (Mills-Novoa and Hermoza). While Peru’s 2009 Water Resources Law 
emphasises IWRM principles and 'soft-path' management strategies, it also creates mechanisms by 
which hydraulic projects that are considered to be an "exceptional measure for national public interest" 
can be approved and implemented. 
Warner et al., explore the case of Ecuador where the sumak kawsay/buen vivir (good living) concept 
has been developed as a counter-hegemonic discourse of respect for Mother Earth (pachamama) and 
an alternative to exploitative Western practices. At the same time, dams have been promoted as 
providers of clean energy and 'good living' for Ecuadorians. Ecuador has claimed to be a champion of a 
green and sovereign economy that does not use fossil fuels and has deployed the so-called Yasuni ITT 
initiative, whereby the country would receive international compensation for leaving its oil in the 
ground. Yet the state has massively reinvested oil revenues in infrastructures such as hydropower 
dams, irrigation schemes and flood control structures. Between 2007 and 2015, US$ 5.9 billion was 
invested in the simultaneous construction of eight hydropower plants in the country. 
In Brazil most of the priorities stated in the National Plan for Water Resources 2012-2015 relate to 
institutional reforms (supporting the creation of basin committees, defining criteria for water licensing, 
monitoring of water bodies, water charges, development of conflict-solving institutions, etc) that are in 
line with IWRM 'best practices' (Roman). Yet, the state is pushing ahead with a massive programme of 
hydroelectric dams in the Amazon and inter-basin transfers such as the US$12 billion 'transposição' 
project in the Nordeste, where water scarcity is seen by the state as a supply problem to be resolved 
through massive water infrastructure. The state of Ceará also pioneered a decentralised and 
participatory management approach focused on water as an economic good, integrated water 
management at the basin level, and water resources planning, through which it gained a reputation 
"that helped back its demands for supplementary water supply from the São Francisco River". 
In China regional water scarcity and acute water pollution are now resulting in growing media 
coverage and popular outrage (see, for example, Kaiman, 2013). The recognition that the demand for 
water has to be constrained and that greater care has to be taken to protect existing waters translated 
into the Ministry of Water Resources’ announcement of the 'Most Stringent Standards' or 'Three Red 
Lines' policy, which set targets for total water use, water use efficiency, and ambient water quality 
(Crow-Miller et al.). These standards continue the tradition of imposing centralised targets that are to 
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be met by provincial and lower-level governments, and they have not significantly altered the centrality 
of mega projects, exemplified by the Three Gorges Dam and the massive South-North Water Transfer 
Project (SNWTP). 
In examining flood detention basins in Northern Italy, Osti suggests that they actually represent a 
softer approach than the river lining and channelization practices of past flood management. He 
identifies a search for a multifunctional use of infrastructures that also allows for an increase in 
biodiversity (small wetland zones) or open-air activities like hiking and biking. A break with the past is 
the inclusion of experts in biology and ecology for greening the infrastructure. 
On balance, as reflected in the renewed stream of dam construction worldwide (Zarfl et al., 2015) 
and the continued attractiveness of other kinds of water megaprojects, it is apparent that large-scale 
infrastructure development is here to stay and has remained largely unswayed by the 'ecological turn', 
or the promotion of demand management or 'soft path' thinking, irrespective of their respective merits 
and achievements. Yet, the need to justify capital-intensive infrastructure in the face of commitments 
to sustainability, while borrowing from the conventional grammar of project justifications (see Molle 
2008), has generated a few innovative tropes and rhetorical devices. These rhetorical justifications take 
several forms. 
The transposição project in Northeast Brazil is a typical example of a redemption project ('the sertão 
will turn into a sea', 'the infrastructure will change the face of the semiarid', and 'eradicate the thirst of 
people in the sertão'). The 'social character' of the project is emphasised by stressing that the diverted 
water is intended to be used for human and animal consumption and that the transposição is not 
intended to serve any broader purposes of development (i.e. not meant to help develop export-
oriented irrigated agriculture or industrial activities). Repackaging strategies are apparent in the 
project’s four successive name changes, starting with the Project of Diversion of the São Francisco River 
Waters to the Semiarid Regions of the Pernambuco, Ceará, Paraíba and Rio Grande do Norte States, 
and ultimately becoming the Project of Integration of the São Francisco River (Roman). 
Likewise, in South Africa in 2015, the Water Minister distanced herself from past dam construction 
projects built mainly for energy and mining industries, emphasising that they will now benefit villages 
and local communities (Bourblanc). In Mexico, too, the National Water Commission stresses that the 
Zapotillo Dam is not a stand-alone dam, but rather forms part of an Integral Hydrological System of 
Works on the Verde River (Sistema Integral Hídrica de Obras del Río Verde), with multiple objectives: 
avoiding further depletion of the level of Lake Chapala, while at the same time providing 'hydrological 
security' to the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara, the city of León and rural areas (McCulligh and 
Tetrault). 
Window dressing is often unconvincing, however. Opponents to the transposição point to the large 
share of water allocated to irrigation, while opponents to the Garuda Great Seawall – officially known 
as the National Capital Integrated Coastal Development programme – stress that it is in fact an urban 
development project masquerading as flood mitigation and that the main cause of flooding (land 
subsidence resulting from groundwater overdraft) is left unattended. 
The narrative of scarcity, a child of natural determinism and Malthusianism often coupled with 
doomsday scenarios, has long been used to legitimate capital-intensive infrastructural responses to 
water provision challenges (Swyngedouw, 1999; Mehta, 2001, 2010; Molle et al., 2009a; Crow-Miller, 
2015): an unfortunate climatic deficiency is limiting supply and constraining an inexorably growing 
demand in ways that have to be remedied to allow for growth and poverty alleviation, while avoiding a 
looming disaster. Associated with a discourse of water plenty or 'excess' applied to a nearby basin, and 
cemented by a discourse of 'equity', 'national integration', 'hydro-solidarity' or 'reducing interregional 
disparities', a strong case is built for an interbasin-transfer. This rhetoric is illustrated in this special 
issue by the cases of the South-North Transfer in China, the transposição in Brazil, the Lesotho 
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Highlands Water Project in South Africa, the Alto Piura Project in Peru and the Sardar Sarovar Project in 
India. 
Huge economic benefits are invariably promised by such projects and, it is said, cannot be turned 
down or foregone: hydropower production at the Three-Gorges Dam generated US$25 billion in 
revenue in its few years of operation alone, all the while only partially operational (Yang and Lu, 2013). 
Likewise, the waters of the SNWTP allow the economic status quo in China’s political and economic 
(northern) powerhouse to be maintained, at least for now. In Peru, "the language of exceptionality 
surrounding large-scale infrastructure is reflected in the justification of Alto-Piura Project and other 
large mega-irrigation projects as a key 'stimulating agent for the economy', vitally important to 
generate regional employment via 'a massive reactivation of the agricultural sector'". For India's water 
minister, the Interlinking of Rivers Project, which seems to be back on the agenda, has to be 
constructed merely because it "is a matter of national benefit" (Bagla, 2014). 
Another familiar device is TINA (There Is No Alternative), often associated with the idea that 
infrastructure building is a 'no regrets' process, as everyone agrees that 'something' has to be done 
about the incongruity of water supply and demand. As expressed by a Dutch expert regarding The 
Garuda Seawall in Jakarta, "there are only two options, retreat or advance. We either abandon and 
evacuate north Jakarta, which is a non-starter, or we advance out into the bay with the seawall" 
(quoted in Sherwell, 2016). This is echoed by the President himself, who emphasised that "It is 
estimated that all of North Jakarta will sink below sea level by 2030 (…) because of that, the 
development of the capital’s seaside, which has been delayed for so long, is the answer for Jakarta" 
(ibid). Similar sentiments have been expressed about the SNWTP, with one government official in 
Beijing noting that "if we don’t have enough water then we must find a method to get more. (…) Maybe 
[the SNWTP] is not the best method, but we must use it. (…) If we don’t solve the water problem, the 
city will die" (quoted in Crow-Miller, 2015). 
Megaprojects also play well-known roles in nation-building and in generating symbolic capital for 
political elites. The Garuda Great Seawall is the visible embodiment of an aspiration to become a 
modern, 'world class' metropolis on a par with Singapore. The Three Gorges Dam represents a "unique 
brand of modernity 21st century China has sought to produce for itself, one that uses visions of 
technological praxis in which the engineer is a 'good god' (Sze, 2015: 86) to inform national identity, 
economic development, and political legitimacy". It can be interpreted as, "a showcase of China’s 
opening up, China’s ability to rely on its own technological capacity without abandoning national 
independence to outside interests, and its enduring capacity to dominate nature" (Crow-Miller et al.). 
In Gujarat, the dam, the canal, the pipeline, and modern technology are all rhetorically tied together 
and linked with an image of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a benevolent protector for 
Gujarat, acting under the blessing of Indian independence fighter and statesman Vallabbhai ('Sardar') 
Patel, whose statue – the world’s tallest – is soon to be erected at the dam site (Luxion). The intended 
transfer of symbolic power reinforces the hold on power of Mr. Modi, and subsequently that of the 
high-officials who control the allocation of the water itself as well as contracts for infrastructure 
operation and maintenance. In addition, the Narmada pipeline project undercuts the independence of 
Gujarat’s minority regions (North Gujarat, Kutch, and Saurashtra) and makes them dependent on the 
state’s willingness to deliver water to them. 
New and often creative justifications are constantly being developed for such projects. In Ecuador, 
resilient coalitions in favour of large-scale infrastructure development have incorporated in their 
discourses paradigms à la mode such as "the WEF [water, energy, food] Nexus approach, the greening 
of the economy, climate change resilience, in addition to the 'buen vivir' ideology" (Warner et al.). The 
'hydraulic mission' is now presented as a solution to guarantee water, food and energy security in times 
Water Alternatives - 2017  Volume 10 | Issue 2 
Crow-Miller et al.: The (re)turn to infrastructure for water management?  Page | 202 
of climate change and the nexus.2 Hydropower projects now qualify for top-up funding through the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Mäkinen and Khan, 2010); the World Bank presents dams as 
climate buffers". Regarding the American West, however, Perry and Praskievicz stress that changing 
biophysical realities in the face of climate change, increasing urban demand/expansion and the 
intensification of agriculture are important drivers that cannot be taken lightly. Still, if nothing else, the 
(re)turn to infrastructure has enriched the repertoire of justifications. 
The next question explored through this collection of articles is that of what a (re)turn (or, in some 
cases, an enduring commitment) to big infrastructure tells us about the governance and wider politics 
of large-scale infrastructure problems. Unsurprisingly, there is clear evidence of the permanence of the 
interest groups 'traditionally' attached to capital-intensive infrastructure projects (see Worster, 1985 
and Molle et al., 2009b), while the challenges from decentralised management bodies, civil society or 
dissenting groups remain largely 'under control'. In Brazil, the drought narrative has long been a means 
for regional and local political elites as well as private companies to attract public funding and aid, 
under what is called the 'drought industry' (Empinotti, 2007). Climate-driven vulnerability of poor 
households has been identified as a political opportunity for landed elites, who often extend material 
aid in exchange for votes. Companies involved in the construction of the transposição have recently 
been caught up in a corruption scandal.3 
In the case of Northern Italy, Osti suggests that flood management (in the form of detention basins) 
is now "negotiated, planned and implemented by subnational public bodies", and less centrally driven 
than it once was. Yet, he points to the presence of a "duopoly formed by the strong alliance between 
construction firms and civil engineering managers. The rewards are not only money but also 
professional prestige, career advancement, and a sense of mastery over nature". Somewhat differently, 
in Mexico McCulligh and Tetrault argue that "large-scale water infrastructure projects serve as a vehicle 
for the realisation of capital through construction contracts and rent-seeking in operating 
infrastructure". The Mexican state continues to play an important role in promoting such projects and 
repressing opposition, but it is contracts with private companies that ensure project profitability and 
help to minimise risk. In Peru, the Alto-Piura Project, and dams and interbasin-tunnels more generally, 
have been prone to corruption, as revealed in particular by the 'Lava Jato Investigative Commission' 
that uncovered corruption schemes with Brazilian companies and contractual irregularities with the 
Obrainsa-Astaldi construction company. 
In Indonesian, the GGSP is already mired in corruption allegations, before rising from the ground.4 
More subtly, Colven posits that "drawing on their post-colonial influence, the Dutch have been 
instrumental in shaping flood mitigation technologies and water governance in Jakarta, with 
contemporary knowledge transfers and networks of expertise from the Netherlands to Jakarta that 
promote Dutch engineering expertise, of which the GGSW is a product, even as the same actors 
promote a very different 'ecological turn' elsewhere". She points to the interest of the Dutch water 
sector in Indonesia (comprising knowledge institutions, consultancy firms, and technical companies) 
and how it stands to benefit from the project "through lucrative international contracts". 
In the case of China, Crow-Miller et al., identify a techno-political water management regime 
comprising not only infrastructures and other technologies, but also "ideologies, and networks of 
institutions, their practices and the capital they are able to mobilise: a regime fundamentally shaped by 
both past choices and current political-economic conditions". Emerging from and embodying this 
                                                          
2
 See Water Alternatives Special Issue 'Critical Thinking on the 'New Security Convergence' in Energy, Food, Climate and Water: 
Is the Nexus Secure … and for Whom?', www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/tp1-2/1888-vol8/288-issue8-1  
3
 http://g1.globo.com/pernambuco/noticia/2015/12/pf-cumpre-mandados-de-busca-e-prisao-sobre-fraudes-no-s-
francisco.html. See also Dias (2016). 
4
  www.indonesia-investments.com/news/news-columns/corruption-in-indonesia-agung-podomoro-land-bribery-
case/item7174; and www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2016/04/07/qa-the-problem-with-jakartas-land-reclamation.html  
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regime, they also point to what has been termed the Chinese Water Machine (see Webber and Han, 
forthcoming). This machine is an assemblage of corporatised enterprises, government ministries, 
departments at multiple scales of the governance structure, universities and foreign corporations that 
together form the "institutional embodiment of China’s commitment to large infrastructure" for water 
management in the contemporary era, a commitment that now increasingly extends beyond its own 
borders. In Ecuador, for example, as in many other countries in South America, Southeast Asia and 
Africa, Chinese money and cooperation go "hand in hand with the hiring of Chinese dam construction 
companies and expertise and little to no conditionalities as to possible socio-environmental effects of 
these dams" (Warner et al.). Whatever the terms and concept employed [Mexico’s 'techno-political 
network', South Africa’s 'policy networks', Italy’s 'duopoly', China’s 'water machine', or more generally 
'iron triangles' (see Molle, 2008)], the financial and political interests associated with capital-intensive 
infrastructures are constitutive drivers of the re(turn)/permanence of infrastructure development. 
In several cases, there are also important historical contingencies and financial connections that 
suggest we pay due attention to the historical factors that have shaped such hard infrastructural 
pathways when it comes to water. In the South African case, the post apartheid transformation of the 
water bureaucracy is significant (Bourblanc). The bureaucracy became increasingly staffed by black 
South Africans, who by definition were less embedded in the engineering policy network. However, 
their lack of experience has forced them to rely on the country’s engineering consulting firms, which 
are dominated by the white engineers who left the water bureaucracy. The current fate of big 
infrastructure projects in this context depends on the ability of the new black water bureaucracy 
(enrolling a variety of water users and other non-water professionals) to sidestep the white engineering 
network in favour of more decentralised proposals to focus instead on the demand side. In this case, 
the debate is not only over policy and securing the consultancies and contracts associated with water 
projects but also between policy networks that carry with them broader political interests and concerns 
related to race and the colonial, and post-colonial past. Similarly, the Nairobi case presented by 
Blomkvist and Nilsson points to the significance of history and the role of colonial attitudes about 
service delivery to white and non-white populations. The legacy of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia is 
also central in the Garuda Project. 
In other cases, the most important contingencies come in the form of infrastructure itself. Perry and 
Praskievicz suggest that local path dependencies, demonstrated by the auxiliary supply-side 
infrastructure projects found across the American West, play an important role in determining water 
management options for the present and future. Existing infrastructure, they show, can provide an 
opportunity to expand supply-side approaches to water management without constructing new 
infrastructure, which minimises the need for additional land inputs and can work within environmental 
regulation frameworks that often do not allow for the construction of new dams in developing 
countries. In China, Crow-Miller et al. discuss the legacy of particular types of water management 
projects from imperial times and point to the technological, social, and institutional lock-ins they have 
produced as key inheritances shaping water management options today. 
But infrastructure is also about sourcing capital. Historically, development banks have been the key 
providers of funds. But after the World Bank pulled out of the Arun-3 hydropower project in Nepal, for 
example, half a dozen other projects have been built with other donor and private-sector funding 
(Gyawali, 2013). The Mekong is a vivid illustration of how alternative donors (foremost China, but also 
Thailand, Malaysia, etc) have side-lined multilateral funding (Hensengerth, 2015; Hirsch, 2016). Warner 
et al., also point to the increasing number of projects that are funded privately, or even through 
'voluntary contributions' from the population (such as Rogun Dam in Tajikistan, Grand Renaissance Dam 
in Ethiopia, or the doubling of capacity of the Suez Canal in Egypt). Ecuador (Warner et al.) stands out as 
an example of the outward thrust of China in search of raw materials in exchange for turn-key projects 
constructed by Chinese companies (McDonald et al., 2009). 
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Next, we ask of these papers what they say about changes in the scale at which water is managed 
within countries. In one sense this is a matter of regional as opposed to national governments – a 
matter of spatial scale. As economies grow and more capital is accumulated, as concentrations of 
population and demand grow, so the spatial scale of what counts as a big infrastructure project has 
been growing too. The 300-km long Mulholland Canal that takes water from California’s Sierra Nevada 
mountains into Los Angeles was once regarded a major feat of water engineering. Now the São 
Francisco River interbasin transfer project in Brazil is composed of about 500 km of canals, pipes and 
aqueducts (Roman) and China’s South North Water Transfer Project involves two sets of canals, each 
more than 1,200 kilometres long (Crow-Miller et al.). But it is also a question of social scale - the degree 
to which civil society actors can influence decisions about water management: whether they can 
prevent projects that are against their perceived interests, whether they can promote projects that 
seem important to them. In the end, large-scale infrastructure projects need to be financed, using 
money outside the capacity of local people to provide, so the voices of local people are rarely decisive 
in advancing a project. But people’s voices may or may not be heard opposing, suggesting modifications 
or encouraging a project. Do the histories that these papers recount say whether these voices are 
becoming more powerful or less? 
In some places the voices of local people were never significant, and they remain largely ignored and 
unheard. Such is the case in Nairobi (Blomkvist and Nilsson), where the city’s water supply system was 
originally engineered to provide a European-style water delivery system to satisfy the needs and wants 
of the colonial elite; the system continues to supply 'formal' water in this way to richer sections of the 
city’s population, largely ignoring the need to supply poorer parts of the city. Likewise in Jakarta, the 
planned Great Garuda Sea Wall seems to be the project of a geographically and historically contingent 
techno-political network, formed through political and economic interests, world-class city aspirations 
of Jakarta’s elites, engineering expertise, capital flows, colonial histories, and postcolonial relations 
between Jakarta and the Netherlands (Colven). Again, in China, the South North Water Transfer (Crow-
Miller et al.) is a project of the central government, with support from several northern and central 
provincial-level governments; people’s voices – even the more than 350,000 who were evicted from 
their homes to make way for the dams and canals – were irrelevant. 
In other places, a democratic revolution promised to provide those who previously had no voice 
with the opportunity to affect policies over water. In South Africa, after the end of apartheid, non-
whites gained formal political control over the water bureaucracy and a new language emerged of 
providing water to all by freeing up water 'saved' through demand management (Bourblanc). Yet these 
voices were largely frustrated by an alliance of engineers and (supply-side oriented) engineering 
consulting firms within South Africa, so that a demand-driven approach to water provision never really 
materialised on the ground. At present, Bourblanc concludes, the newly enfranchised political voices 
are seeking to create new networks of support and expertise that might undermine the power of the 
established networks. In one sense, then, those previously excluded now have a voice, but through 
their elected representatives rather than directly. Also speaking to broader questions of democracy, 
Osti suggests that the persistence of a rigid and closed-door policy community in Northern Italy that 
drives the development of detention basin projects is itself an indication of "low-quality democracy" 
insofar as water management planning remains far from participatory. 
In Peru, interbasin transfers are considered as lying beyond the prerogatives of river basins 
themselves and instead fall under the purview of the central administration (Mills-Novoa and Taboada 
Hermoza). This justifies the bypassing of the newly formed River Basin Councils which, however, will 
later have to handle the management complexities, environmental impacts, and user conflicts 
invariably generated by such megaprojects. A similar situation is observed in Brazil, where the National 
Council for Water Resources (CNRH), has the power to override the River Basin Committees which only 
have advisory and consultative functions (Roman). This is how the final decision in favour of the 
transposição was taken in the CNRH, despite protests by the São Francisco River Basin Committee 
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(CBHSF) and social movements engaged against the project: indeed, several environmental NGOs and 
left-wing developmentalist political parties, which were formerly supportive of Lula’s policies, have 
disagreed with the federal government over the transposição. 
In other places, local scale voices of opposition to such projects have been loud, although they have 
often been met with strong repression by the state (Warner et al.). In Ecuador, the civil society, 
grassroots organisations and NGOs have been increasingly vocal in the defence of their interests and 
rights in the past 15 years. But contrary to its initial promise to work with indigenous organisations and 
include them in decision-making, the Correa government eventually pursued a reinvigorated hydraulic 
mission and fought against grassroots resistance. Opponents to such a mission and the work done in its 
name are often depicted as anti-developmentalists holding the people back, but as in the case of the 
Chone Dam, even regional dams may be expediently 'securitised' (Buzan et al., 1998). Likewise, 
McCulligh and Tetrault show that there has been a relatively strong civil resistance to water projects in 
Mexico, but also a strong and often violent government repression of environmental activism. At the 
Zapatillo Dam, for example, the interests of large-scale agricultural producers and industrialists in the 
León area have trumped those of the smaller scale farmers in the Jalisco highlands. The opposition – an 
alliance of local communities, NGOs, university groups and religious leaders in nearby Guadalajara – has 
been met with threats and intimidation from the police and military (McCulligh and Tetrault). Beyond El 
Zapatillo, the Mexican state has gained a reputation not only for actual violence against water 
'activists', but also for enacting structural violence against communities contesting its water 
development agenda (see, for example, Radonic, 2015). Finally, the Sardar Sarovar Dam has figured as 
one of India’s most controversial projects, opposition to which has amounted to a nearly-three decade 
long local movement with important international resonance (Luxion). Since 2000, the state of Gujarat 
has reinvented the dam as a means of providing drinking water to Gujarat’s cities and industrial regions 
through a new round of water-delivery infrastructures. As Luxion notes, the project exemplifies the 
state’s model of development that emphasises the construction of infrastructure, the centralisation of 
power, and the use of narrative and spectacle as modes of governance – and the vilification of 
opponents. While Luxion calls this the 'Gujarat model of development' the papers in this issue reveal 
just how common such a model is. 
What these papers collectively reveal is a multi-faceted relation between scale and voice on the one 
hand and the new round of large water infrastructure projects on the other. Scale has generally (though 
not always) been increasing, as water is brought from further and further afield to satisfy the demands 
of new urban and industrial agglomerations and agricultural irrigators. Even in the case of flood control 
infrastructures, scale is sometimes increasing dramatically, as in Jakarta. With this increase in scale has 
generally come a shift in power away from regional and up to multi-regional agencies of governance, 
such as the central state. Sometimes these shifts in scale and power have no effect on the salience of 
local voices – because in the past they were never heard or generally suppressed anyway. Sometimes 
the shifts in power and scale have been accompanied by increasing suppression of local voices of 
opposition. In one case – South Africa – the change in scale has seen a stand-off between 
representatives of new voices and the infrastructure-focused engineering elite. 
While no collection of articles could conclusively answer the questions we set out to address, this 
group of contributions from around the world offers a rich exploration of important issues about the 
apparent endurance of big infrastructure projects for water management. It is clear that while we are 
seeing a return to such projects in many parts of the world, many places never officially departed from 
such a water management strategy. What we see now, in many cases, is a quiet recommitment to big 
dams, massive interbasin transfers and flood protection systems, but now couched strategically in 
discourses about green development, sustainability, and the like. Interestingly, the rhetoric used to 'sell' 
large-scale infrastructures has ultimately changed little. Climate-change is the most recent scapegoat 
lending justification for enhanced storage capacity. The need for more security against climate vagaries, 
and therefore for more storage or inter-basin transfers should not be dismissed or taken lightly. What is 
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clear, however, is that more storage or supply generally translates into more unchecked demands 
rather than to a buffering capacity, thus fuelling the next crisis and the next supply augmentation 
project (Molle, 2008). 
These papers also suggest that while governance and politics are centrally important, we would do 
well to pay greater attention to both the historical contingencies and the financial connections that 
have helped to shape the water infrastructure projects of today. Noteworthy is the preference for 
capital-intensive projects over addressing root causes of water mismanagement. With large water 
infrastructure projects seen as a good investment opportunity, sources of capital are no longer limited 
to the World Bank and other usual suspects, but have expanded to private financiers and, perhaps most 
significantly, Chinese banks, which increasingly side-line traditional development banks and their 
conditionalities. 
Finally, it seems that the spatial scale at which water is being managed is becoming larger, and that 
it has generally involved a shift in the scale at which decisions are made, from regional toward multi-
regional or central governments. In many, but by no means all of the cases examined in this special 
issue, these changes in scale have been accompanied by increasing suppression of local oppositional 
voices. As these projects work to consolidate and reinforce the power of existing political elites, and 
deliver significant political and financial rewards to high-level actors, it seems that big infrastructure for 
water management may be here to stay. 
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